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Introduction 
 
A Small Place, written by Jamaica Kincaid1, a West Indian writer 
living in the US, belongs to her non-fiction prose: this generic crossing is 
indeed the first surprise the uninformed reader comes across when taking 
up the book. The second lies in the echoic discourse that Kincaid’s prose 
is based on. It seems to present itself in the manner and style of a travel 
guidebook to the mesmerizing island of Antigua, directly addressed to the 
reader in the second person. But the echo soon becomes satirical as 
discursive twists push the reader to grasp Kincaid’s “oppositional irony”: 
more of an anti-travel guidebook, A Small Place is often disparaged as 
being “too angry”2. If animated by a rhetoric of anger, I would contend 
that Kincaid’s forceful writing stops short of an excess of anger through a 
very controlled writing that keeps the reader from rejecting the book 
entirely while being severely put under attack. The purpose of this paper is 
to evince how she stylistically manages to back the reader into a corner 
                                                
1  Elaine Potter Richardson changed her name to Jamaica Kincaid in order to be able to 
write about her past as a West-Indian Antiguan girl under British Rule. The change in 
names was a way for her “to do things without being the same person who couldn’t do 
them—the same person who had all these weights” (see Garis). 
2  Richard Gottleib, the New Yorker’s editor of the 1980s rejected its inclusion in his 
magazine as “too angry" (Kincaid had become a staff worker for the New Yorker in 1976, 
her editorial work in other magazines having come to the attention of the New Yorker’s 
editor of the time: William Shawn). 
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without entirely antagonizing her; on the contrary, through a successful 
perlocutionary effect, she compels the reader to take a new footing and 
sensitively alter her ways of seeing colonial history. One of Kincaid’s 
rhetorical strategies lies in her (meta) deictic use of personal pronouns 
performing ideological crossings and ironical reversals. Another incisive 
weapon that Kincaid makes an abundant use of here is negation: A Small 
Place is saturated with diverse negative forms that entertain with their 
positive counterparts both a satirical and paradoxical relationship.   
 
 
1. The politics of deixis 
 
1.1. Through the looking glass 
In the manner of the travel guidebook, the first lines of A Small 
Place seem to take the reader on a privileged trip to the exotic beauty of 
Antigua: “If you go to Antigua as a tourist, this is what you will see”. The 
second-person pronoun3 refers to the implied, ideal reader that might be 
anyone willing to discover this “nine mile wide by twelve mile long” 
Caribbean island which became independent from the United Kingdom in 
1981. However, Kincaid evokes this generic intertext the better to 
deconstruct it4: the tone soon becomes accusatory. The reader is not 
invited but compelled to occupy the position of the potential tourist. The 
“you” is literally assigned a reading posture which it cannot escape, as the 
identification of the reader with the tourist is incessantly recalled: “since 
you are a tourist”, “you are on holiday, you are a tourist”, “you, the 
tourist”. The second person has nothing of the “impersonal or 
generalized” pseudo-deictic you that can be found in proverbs for 
                                                
3  “You” here seems to embody “the Instructions and Guide Book you” prototype where 
“the actual addressee is described as doing things in a possible application of the 
instructions” (Fludernik 1993, 235). Kincaid seems indeed to describe the typical 
behaviour of the tourist: “you take a bath, you brush your teeth. You get dressed again; as 
you get dressed, you look out the window...” (12). 
4  This is the principle of satire as studied by Paul Simpson. In his analysis of the discursive 
processes of satire, the author distinguishes two elements that correspond to two phases of 
irony: the first element called “the prime” constitutes an intertextual echo of some other 
discourse (this is the echoic irony phase), here it would be the discourse of the travel 
guidebook. The second structural element of satire called “the dialectic” is “text-
internal”; it embodies “an opposing idea” that comes into conflict with the echoic 
discourse (this is the “oppositional irony” phase), here the stigmatisation of the tourist 
(Simpson 2003, 89).  
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instance5, its deictic reference is clearly delineated; it addresses the North 
American or European white tourist: 
 
You disembark from your plane. You go through customs. Since you are a 
tourist, a North American or European—to be frank, white—and not an 
Antiguan black returning to Antigua from Europe or North America with 
cardboard boxes of much needed cheap clothes and food for relatives you 
move through customs swiftly, you move through customs with ease. (4-5) 
 
In unambiguously assigning placement, Kincaid brings to light that what 
we, white readers, perceive as the “universal”, natural reference of “you” is 
in fact a clearly marked-out racial construction. By emphasizing the taken-
for-granted reference, “Kincaid […] challenges the monolithic ‘you’ that 
implies a universal, deracinated, ideal construct” (Richardson 2006, 33).  
In A Small Place, the readers, narratologically reduced to the class 
of “the tourist” (a distinct class determined by the definite article), are 
forced to face their reflection in the satirical mirror Kincaid is holding to 
them: “The thing you have always suspected about yourself the minute 
you become a tourist is true: the tourist is an ugly human being” (14). 
Uninterested in the historical context of the country they have alighted on, 
the tourists are here to satisfy their expectations of blue sky, cocktails and 
bathing in the bluest waters: “you see yourself taking a walk on that beach, 
you see yourself eating some delicious, locally grown food. You see 
yourself, you see yourself…”. But Kincaid compels the reader to look 
through the narcissistic mirror and see what is on the other side of exotic 
beauty; not only is the food not local (or it might be but it has first 
transited through Florida) but the transparent water the tourist longs so 
much to bathe in may not have the purity she expects: “the contents of 
your lavatory might, just might, graze gently against your ankle as you 
wade carefree in the water, for you see, in Antigua, there is no proper 
sewage-disposal system” (14). The stereotyping of the tourist (“only a 
cliché can explain you”, 15) is here a purposeful strategy designed to 
match the objectification the tourist usually subjects the native to. The 
tourist appropriates the site (“Oh, but you’re tired of all this looking, and 
you want to reach your destination, your hotel, your room, 12, my 
                                                
5  There is here complete agreement between the morphological form “you” and its deictic 
function (addressing) whereas “generalized you” tends to lose its “deictic force” (see 
Herman 1994). 
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emphasis), turning the native’s miserable existence into “a source of 
pleasure”6. 
Kincaid lends her voice to the natives, formulating what is usually 
kept silent for the sake of the tourist industry: 
 
it will never occur to you that the people who inhabit the place in which 
you have just paused cannot stand you, that behind their closed doors they 
laugh at your strangeness (you do not look the way they look); the physical 
sight of you does not please them; you have bad manners (it is their custom 
to eat their food with their hands; you try eating their way, you look silly; 
you try eating the way you always eat, you look silly); they do not like the 
way you speak (you have an accent); they collapsed helpless from laughter, 
mimicking the way they imagine you must look as you carry out some 
everyday bodily function. They do not like you. They do not like me (17). 
 
In the virtual confrontation Kincaid performs between the tourist and the 
native, she presents herself as neither belonging to one party nor to the 
other (“they do not like me”). As an expatriate Antiguan working and 
living in the US, Kincaid can hold together two distinct ideological 
perspectives. She never allows the reader to fall back on her naturalised 
white way of reading and seeing. To do so, she often resorts to parentheses 
that clearly state from whose perspective the narrator is writing. This 
typographic sign that slows down the reading is indeed a way for Kincaid 
to insert a second voice inside the first voice: “And you look at the things 
they can do with a piece of ordinary cloth, the things they fashion out of 
cheap, vulgarly colored (to you) twine” (16), “they build enormous (for 
Antigua), ugly (for Antigua), concrete buildings in Antigua’s capital, St 
John’s” (11). 
 
 
                                                
6  Despite the cliché symmetry she tries to re-establish here, Kincaid points out the inherent 
dissymmetry between the two parties. If the tourist is also a native from some place, the 
Antiguan tourist can hardly occupy the position of the tourist: “Every native would like to 
find a way out, every native would like a rest, every native would like a tour. But some 
natives—most natives in the world—cannot go anywhere. They are too poor. They are too 
poor to go anywhere. They are too poor to escape the reality of their lives; and they are 
too poor to live properly in the place where they live, which is the place you, the tourist, 
want to go—so the natives see you, the tourist, they envy you, they envy your ability to 
leave your own banality and boredom, they envy your ability to turn their own banality 
and boredom into a source of pleasure for yourself” (18-19).  
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1.2. Shifting subject positions and deictic references 
In A Small Place, Kincaid strategically uses personal pronouns to 
satirical ends. In his study of satirical discourse, Paul Simpson considers 
satire a discursive practice embodying three subject positions: A. the 
satirist (the producer of the text), B. the satiree (the addressee) and C. the 
satirised (“the target attacked or critiqued in the satirical discourse”) 
(Simpson 2003, 8). In placing the reader in the stigmatized place of the 
tourist, Kincaid merges the place of the satiree (B) and that of the satirized 
(C), thus exposing herself to a possible rejection on the part of the 
addressee7. Yet the purpose of satire is here to invite the reader to take a 
distance from where she can take a renewed look at herself8. And 
paradoxically, in having the reader work through the ironical statements, A 
Small Place manages to bring closer together satirist and satiree9, for as 
Elizabeth Black recalls “recognition of irony promotes solidarity” 10. 
Solidarity is further encouraged in the second and third chapters as they 
present a shift in subject positions: position C is there taken up by the 
English colonizers of the past (chapter 2) and the foreign investors and the 
corrupted Antiguan independent government of the present (chapter 3). 
In both chapters, the satirized is referred to with the personal pronoun 
“they”, which tends to simultaneously shorten the bonds between narrator 
(I) and addressee (you) and lengthen the connection with target C. 
The second chapter indeed relates the story of Kincaid’s childhood 
in Antigua. The reader, still addressed as “you”, is here assigned the 
position of the witness and writing companion: “let me tell you…” 
Kincaid recurrently says in the second chapter. The “I” of the first chapter 
shifts towards a collective reference: it morphs into an inclusive “we”, 
forcing in-group consciousness on the reader. Adopting the viewpoint of 
                                                
7  Simpson contends that the closer the satiree is to the satirized, the more likely the satiree 
is either to not get the irony or to reject the satire completely: “The more closely situated 
someone is to the target of satire, the less likely or able they are to identify that target” 
(Simpson 2003, 173). 
8  For Simpson, that is the general purpose of satire: “What satire does is to invite the satiree 
to concur by reaching a synthesis that offers, in Popper’s terms, a ‘new way of seeing’” 
(Simpson 2003, 108). 
9  As Simpson puts it: “the relationship is such that ‘successful’ satire, in keeping with the 
general principle of humour delivery and reception, tends to ‘shorten’ the connection 
between positions A and B, thereby bringing these discursive positions closer together” 
(Simpson 2003, 87). 
10  “If we appreciate it we feel ourselves to be part of the ‘in-group’ addressed, and are 
therefore not only entertained, but flattered. It engages us more deeply in the text” (Black 
2006, 119). 
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the little girl during British colonization, Kincaid brings into focus the gap 
between the myth of the superior civilized English they were taught at 
school and the rude everyday behaviour of the colonizers:  
 
We felt superior to all these people; we thought perhaps the English among 
them who behaved this way weren’t English at all, for the English were 
supposed to be civilised, and this behaviour was so much like that of an 
animal, the thing we were before the British rescued us, that maybe they 
weren’t from the real England at all but from another England. (30) 
 
Bonding with the narrator in the ironical reversal she effects, the reader 
cannot help but concur with Kincaid in her denunciation of the British 
colonisation. However, the narrator does not look for a mere approval 
from her reader, she seeks acknowledgment of responsibility and this is 
once more obtained through a deictic shift. Taken off guard again, 
apostrophic you returns on the enunciatory plane with a vengeance, no 
longer referring to the tourist or to the witness-reader but to all the British 
masters and all their descendants. The “they” of the English suddenly 
morphs into the “you” of the addressee, thus extending the reference of 
the second person addressee: “Even if I really came from people who were 
living like monkeys in trees, it was better to be that than what happened to 
me, what I became after I met you”(37)11.  
Personal pronouns in A Small Place have a reflexive critical function 
that could be called “metadeictic” 12: through their unstable or shifting 
references, the pronominal triad (I/you/they) reflects on the general theme 
of the book. Here, in bluntly addressing the reader with the second person 
pronoun, Kincaid is performing what Brown and Levinson call a Face 
Threatening Act in their theory of politeness, impolitely impinging on the 
reader’s territory and desire to be free from “imposition” (Brown and 
Levinson 1987, 61). Kincaid’s narratological intrusion mirrors the 
impolite, undesired invasion of the English into native territory: 
 
Let me show you how you looked to us. You came. You took things that 
were not yours, and you did not even, for appearances’ sake, ask first. You 
                                                
11  The second person belongs here to what Richardson calls “the autotelic” type, where 
“you” directly and continually addresses the reader but with a reference that can shift 
along the way. See for instance his analysis of Italo Calvino’s Se una note d’inverno un 
viaggiatore (Richardson 2006, 30-36). 
12  The term “metadeictic” is here to be understood in a reflexive perspective, the use of 
deixis in the communicative context resonating at the level of the contents of the essay: 
the choice of deictic forms indeed mirrors Kincaid’s global message. 
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could have said, “May I have this, please?” and even though it would have 
been clear to everybody that a yes or no from us would have been of no 
consequence you might have looked so much better. Believe me, it would 
have gone a long way. I would have had to admit that at least you were 
polite. (34-35) 
 
By using the same linguistic form (“you”) to refer to the tourist and then 
to all white colonizers’ descendants, she puts on a par past misdeeds and 
present consequences, thus rendering it impossible for the reader to 
disengage her responsibility from the past13.  
The third person plural pronoun referring to present-day Antiguans 
is also “metadeictic”. In the third chapter, she blames post-independence 
Antiguans for passively accepting the place assigned to them by the 
modern version of colonization that is the tourist industry: “they say these 
things, pausing to take breath before this monument to rottenness, that 
monument to rottenness, as if they were tour guides; as if, having observed 
the event of tourism, they have absorbed it so completely that they have 
made the degradation and humiliation of their daily lives into their own 
tourist attraction” (68-69). As Benveniste puts it, excluded from the I/you 
discourse, the third person constitutes a “non-personne” (Benveniste 
1966, 255-256)14. The use of “they” in the third chapter thus reflects 
present-day Antiguans’ passive exclusion from a discourse that is taken 
place without them. 
But Kincaid herself, having, as she says, “met the world through 
England”, is “spoken” by a language that is not hers and that is yet her 
only means to express herself; the opposed points of view that she exposes 
can only be expressed in the (same) English language that will always 
favour one point of view against the other: “for isn’t it odd that the only 
language I have in which to speak the crime is the language of the criminal 
who committed the crime? And what can that really mean? For the 
language of the criminal can contain only the goodness of the criminal’s 
                                                
13  As Sabine Broeck puts it, “Kincaid’s exhortation ‘invites’ us in no uncertain terms to cross 
the critical distance between a disinterested condemnation of colonialism and a 
recognition of our readerly self being implicated in white ethnocentric 
practices/habits/fantasies of control, ignorance, and wilful exercise of privilege” (Broeck 
2002, 841-2). 
14  As Katie Wales underlines, Benveniste’s account of the third person “underplays” its 
deictic force. The third party may be absent from the I/you discourse but still participates 
in it as listeners (Wales 2006, 22, 54). Here it could be said that potential Antiguan 
readers of A Small Place do participate in the dyad if only indirectly since they are 
excluded from the place of the “you” addressee. 
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deed. The language of the criminal can explain and express the deed only 
from the criminal’s point of view /…/ That must be why, when I say, ‘I am 
filled with rage’, the criminal says, ‘But why?’”(32). Thus interpellated by 
a language that is not hers and that negates her rage, Kincaid’s essay is 
underlain by a rhetoric of negation and negativity that we shall now turn 
to. 
 
 
2. Negative and positive polarities 
 
2.1. Satirical negation 
Negation serves Kincaid’s rhetoric of anger as regards the attitude 
of the white tourist. It enables her to attenuate the force of her attacks 
while paradoxically accentuating the strength of her satire. Combined with 
modalization, negation has indeed a devastating satirical effect: “and since 
you are on your holiday, since you are a tourist, the thought of what it 
might be like for someone who had to live a day in, day out in a place that 
suffers constantly from drought, and so has to watch carefully every drop 
of fresh water used […] must never cross your mind” (4). The obligation 
(“must never cross your mind”) is expressed by the deontic modal “must” 
imposed on the tourist by the tourist herself: the latter must go on 
repressing these thoughts if she is to enjoy her holidays. But “must” can 
also here be interpreted epistemically, implying a certain judgment on the 
part of the narrator (of the type “this idea has certainly never crossed your 
mind”). In recurrently stating what the tourist should not do (“but you 
should not think of the confusion that must lie in all that…and you must 
not think of the damaged library”, “it’s better that you don’t know 
that…”), the narrator contrariwise states what they should be doing. Using 
a kind of preterition15, the indirectness of Kincaid’s negations are in fact 
more effective than direct reproach: this is part of the “meaning-making 
resource” of negation” (Nørgaard 2007, 49). Negation tends to 
foreground what is denied and thus to bring it into sharper psychological 
relief: the negated information is not discarded, it “is retained in the 
                                                
15  Praeteritio consists in speaking about something after saying one won’t talk about it. 
Kincaid’s praeteritio is somewhat reversed here: she says what she has to say and then 
only concludes that the reader should not give in to such thoughts. 
18
  Sandrine SORLIN 
 
ongoing mental representation” (Nahajec 2009, 11516). Indeed rather than 
carrying on its function of negating, eliminating information, negation 
paradoxically forces the denied information onto the reader’s mind: “you 
must not wonder what exactly happened to the contents of your lavatory 
when you flushed it. You must not wonder where your bathwater went 
when you pulled out the stopper. You must not wonder what happened 
when you brushed your teeth” (13-14). The reader can no longer pretend 
that what has been said has not been said except through a process of 
denegation which is precisely what Kincaid wants to denounce.  
 Negation has other satirical effects in A Small Place. Kincaid uses 
the whole gamut of negation, resorting to its multi-functionality to diverse 
effects. As a pragmatic device, negation hinges on a cooperative process 
between writer and reader as it “activate[s] implied rather than explicit 
meaning” (Nahajec 109). A negative evokes its positive counterpart at the 
moment it denies it; it presupposes its positive counterpart. Hence in the 
following example, the reader cannot not infer the implied meaning 
contained in the negation: “You disembark from your place. You go 
through customs. Since you are a tourist […] you move through customs 
swiftly, you move through customs with ease. Your bags are not searched” 
(4-5). Without saying it, Kincaid evokes the possibility of bags being 
searched: in the contrast she establishes between white tourists and  
Antiguans, we implicitly understand whose bags are usually searched. If 
negations express positive alternatives, positive statements also exploit the 
negative polarity. Kincaid gives vent to her denunciation by eliciting 
implied denials: in saying “if you were to ask why…” (7), she seems to 
imply the negative “but of course you don’t/won’t”. She also plays on the 
expectation of the reader, leading her down a certain logical path before 
offering a twist that produces “contra-expectation”17. The following 
question “Have I given you the impression that the Antigua I grew up in 
revolved almost completely about England?” seems to announce a 
qualification, a rechanneling of the path taken so far by the narration. The 
answer defeats our expectation as it is met with a positive statement 
                                                
16  Nahajec draws here on the work of Giora, Balaban, Fein & Alkabets, “Negation as 
Positivity in Disguise”, in H.L. Colston (ed). Figurative Language Comprehension: Social 
and Cultural Influences, Mahwah, NJ, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, pp. 233-55. 
17  Defined by Simpson (2003, 82) as what “cuts right across the fabric of the text that 
precedes it”. 
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(“Well, that was so”). This dispreferred18/marked answer disrupting the 
reader’s grammatical and semantic expectations has the effect of 
reinforcing all the more England’s presence. 
Negation also performs a conjoined effect with the numerous 
repetitions that characterise Kincaid’s style. In the following example, 
negation performs oppositional irony. What is said is not the opposite of 
what is meant, as is traditionally said about irony, but it comments on the 
inappropriateness of the negated reality: 
 
The government built a refinery. Something went wrong. The refinery is 
rusting. The tanks are rusting. The platform is rusting. The foreigner who 
did the bad things in the Far East was involved in this. He is not rusting. 
He is very rich and travels the world on a diplomatic passport issued to him 
by the government of Antigua. (67, my emphasis) 
 
“He is not rusting” makes internal reference to the three “is rusting” that 
precede it, expressing by contrast an expectation that is not fulfilled: he 
should be rusting like the rest of the refinery left behind. Thus the 
negation does not play a simple descriptive role here. In using the same 
aspectual and verbal construction, the negative mention is a satirical echo 
that is up to the reader to infer.  
There is one last use of satirical negation in Kincaid’s vast array of 
negative formulations. In a most poetic passage at the end of the book, she 
attempts to describe the amazing ex tempore beauty of Antigua through 
affirmative predications of negative terms used to express inexpressible 
beauty: 
 
No real sunset could look like that; no real seawater could strike that many 
shades of blue at once; no real sky could be that shade of blue—another 
shade of blue, completely different from the shades of blue seen in the 
sea—and no real cloud could be that white and float just that way in that 
blue sky; no real day could be that sort of sunny and bright, making 
everything seem transparent and shallow; and no real night could be that 
sort of black, making everything seem thick and deep and bottomless. (77) 
 
The hyperbolic aesthetisation goes on until, through a stylistic fade out, 
the unreality of the beauty morphs into the unreality of its exact opposite. 
This is where poetry gets satirical overtones: “no real grass is that 
particular shade of dilapidated, rundown green (not enough rain); no real 
                                                
18  On the contrary an unmarked or “preferred” answer is one that is expected, like an 
answer to a question, a greeting to a greeting, etc. (See Jeffries and McIntyre 2010, 102). 
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cows look that poorly as they feed on the unreal-looking grass in the 
unreal-looking pasture, and no real cows look that miserable as some 
unreal-looking egrets sit on their backs eating insects” (78). The 
aesthetization of such poverty becomes indecent: Kincaid forces us to 
swing from one extreme polarity to the other in the same stylistic breath, 
making us perceive the Antiguan poverty in an acute way.  
 
 
2.2. The confiscation of debate and the paradox of negation 
In A Small Place, negation does not always have the indirectness we 
have just underlined. It also serves the primordial function of denying the 
truth of a statement. Kincaid resorts to negation to declare that the terms 
of the debate she raises are not debatable: “all masters of every stripe are 
rubbish, and all slaves of every stripe are noble and exalted, there can be 
no question about this” (80). Here are the unchangeable premises from 
which all conclusions must follow. She confiscates the possibility of 
negating her negative statements. She makes “metalinguistic negation” 19 
impossible: it cannot be asserted in any other terms, according to her, 
because it does not belong to the realm of assertability but to the realm of 
truth. Kincaid transforms her assertions into facts, thus frustrating any 
potential counter-argument. In the following nominalisations which are 
lexically incorporated negations, “the irrevocableness of their bad deeds” 
(23-24), “for not only did we have to suffer the unspeakableness of 
slavery” (10), she seems to set in (nominalized) stone the harm that was 
done and that cannot be erased20. There can be no positive rectification to 
what happened: 
 
But nothing can erase my rage—not an apology, not a large sum of money, 
not the death of the criminal—for this wrong can never be made right, and 
only the impossible can make me still: can a way be found to make what 
happened not have happened? (32) 
                                                
19  Metalinguistic negation is defined as “a means for objecting to a previous utterance”. 
Laurence R. Horn draws here from Oswald Ducrot’s distinction between a descriptive 
negation (“a comment on fact”, preserving presuppositions) and metalinguistic/polemic 
negation (“a comment on utterances”, challenging presuppositions) (Horn 1985, 38).  
20  Metalinguistic negation is impossible on negations that are lexically incorporated: if one 
can say “I’m not happy, I’m ecstatic”, one cannot perform the same metalinguistic 
reanalysis with morphologically incorporated negations: “I’m unhappy, I’m ecstatic” 
(Carston 1998, 335). In Kincaid’s text, the nominalisations make any reanalysis 
impossible. 
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There can be no crossing back to positivity: what remains to live with is 
perpetual loss and mourning21. 
Kincaid’s use of negation seems paradoxically to evoke and 
reinforce the positive polarity that serves as the point of reference in A 
Small Place: through negation, she reveals that the norms with which she 
assesses the state of Antigua are those of western culture: 
 
They have nothing to compare this incredible constant with, no big 
historical moment to compare the way they are now to the way they used to 
be. No industrial Revolution, no revolution of any kind, no Age of 
anything, no world wars, no decades of turbulence balanced by decades of 
calm. Nothing, then, natural or unnatural, to leave a mark on their 
character. It is just a little island. (80) 
 
As Simpson puts it, the negative is a marked form and yet it “seems to be 
stalked, as it were, by the shadow of a positive polarity” (Simpson 2003, 
139)22. Here Kincaid’s negations seem to be overshadowed by the positive 
polarity embodied by western references. The reading grid through which 
she evaluates Antigua’s present is of English conception. In doing so, 
Kincaid may be illustrating the fact that she is condemned to speak and 
see through the language of the criminal.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
However, the writer stylistically demonstrates that she is not the 
passive and captive victim of a language. She uses pragmatic weapons 
against the English tongue, minorising it from within23, namely through 
the eroding work of negation and the subtle play with deixis. Kincaid does 
                                                
21  Here lies maybe a form of life that has a certain positivity to it. We may talk of a 
depathologizing form of negation as Soto-Crespo, drawing on Edward Said’s Culture and 
Imperialism, speaks of depathologized mourning as regards Kincaid’s work: “for this 
diaspora writer, mourning is not a psychological stage that must be overcome; rather 
mourning is the culturally normative yet highly political strategy through which a diaspora 
writer makes transcultural connections” (Soto-Crespo 2002, 371). 
22  In cognitive stylistics (Text World Theory), negation constitutes a subworld disrupting 
the parameters of the matrix world (see Hidalgo-Downing 2000, Sorlin forthcoming). 
Antiguans’s negated world can here be said to be subordinated to the parameters of the 
English western world. 
23  Kincaid’s repetitive style and mesmerizing orality would deserve a whole paper (see 
Simmons 1994 for instance). 
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not incorporate West Indian broken English as a form of linguistic 
resistance to the major language (for Kincaid this is “the English”, she 
writes in one of her novels, “that instantly reveals the humiliation of 
history, the humiliation of the past not remade into art” [My Brother 
108]) but she manages to create different viewpoints from which to 
reassess naturalized certitudes. In the shadow of the (positive) standard 
language, Kincaid imparts on English a renewed forceful character that 
can hardly leave the white western reader indifferent.  
23
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